A shout out to all of my conservative friends!
Reagan’s Personal Spying Machine
by Seth Rosenfeld
September 1, 2012
The New York Times
Monday, December 10, 2012
A True Balkan Thriller
I'm really tempted to start writing a mystery/thriller novel in the face of the real-life story of the Serbian envoy to NATO, Branislav Milinkovic, killing himself a few days ago by leaping off a Brussels parking garage. The way of suicide is dramatic enough but now there are vague statements that Milinkovic had been just days before diagnosed "with a sudden and grave illness," the fact of which made it so, as his wife put it in a Belgrade tabloid (Kurir), he "could not bear the fact of living, as he put it, the rest of his life without human dignity." A perfect setup for the likes of a Hitchcock or Dashiell Hammett! More as it develops.
Friday, September 07, 2012
I was really surprised to discover that nearly 700 handguns were seized by the Transportation Security Administration in just the first half of 2012.
Really? That many in just six months?!? Amazing.... And that's only a count of handguns specifically.... they've also confiscated countless hunting knives, stun guns, throwing stars, even a bazooka round.... Wow- the next time I fly, I'm going to be much less frustrated by the screening process.
Not only that, the TSA blog comments that "In some cases, people simply forgot they had these items." How can you _forget_ you have something like that on your person?! And what does it say about our society that that can even happen? Oy!
Not only that, the TSA blog comments that "In some cases, people simply forgot they had these items." How can you _forget_ you have something like that on your person?! And what does it say about our society that that can even happen? Oy!
Sunday, May 13, 2012
Freedom of the Russian Press: a Story of Lost Trust
I've been going through my papers in preparation for our move. In doing so, I came across this piece; a rare multifaceted piece on the Russian media/political scene. It's highly recommended.
Freedom of the Russian Press: a Story of Lost Trust
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 7 Issue: 209
November 17, 2010
By: Elena Chinyaeva
The recent attack on the Russian journalist and blogger Oleg Kashin left him severely injured. While he was still unconscious in a medically induced coma, an avalanche of speculation surrounded who might be responsible, with the so-called “liberal opposition” groups quarrelling with each other over who would issue the sharpest declaration implying the duumvirate is responsible, at least for a situation when such attacks happen frequently threatening the freedom of the press in Russia (Kommersant, 10 November). Some observers went as far as stating that “former Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, directly implicates Putin and Medvedev in the crime” (EDM, 11 November). While Kasyanov might be surprised with such interpretations, the newly-appeared Kashin sympathizers from among the “liberals” stress how critical Kashin was about the “vertical of power” in Russia. They conveniently overlook how bitter he was about the hypocrisy of those who call themselves “Russian liberal opposition.”
The Kashin case has indeed sharpened the discussions over the freedom of the press and the role of media in Russian society. Two legislative amendments were proposed in the State Duma, to class attacks on journalists as if on state officials punishable by 12-years to life imprisonment. However, as the latest Levada center poll indicates, these initiatives would only irritate the society in general. Over the post-perestroika years, the image of a journalist in the public perception has grown contradictory, as a person who delivers not only objective information but also lies. This year among the ratings of the most respected professions, journalism (8 percent), was the third from last, with only politicians (7 percent) and salespeople (4 percent) scoring worse (Kommersant, November 11).
Paradoxically, Kashin was a good enough professional to address the inconvenient question of why such lukewarm public attitude to journalists and the freedom of press has become reality in Russia. Just a couple of weeks prior to the attack, Kashin ran a series of interviews with some of the organizers of public action against the ruling bureaucracy in which they denounced “unpopular and senseless personages from political opposition,” who only hamper the attempts to develop a meaningful and effective civil protest movement in Russia. As they said, it has become a fashion among “political glitterati ” to show up at the protest meetings, though both “the authorities and the opposition continue to view ordinary people as scum of the earth,” substituting political work with political infighting, while the journalistic community use preset clichés to describe protest groups (Aleksei Navalnyi, Stanislav Yakovlev, Sergei Smirnov, Kommersant, October 19; Maksim Solopov).
In his Kommersant blog, Kashin stated, that in Russia today, with her one-party political system, the state corporations’ monopoly, excessive corruption and feudal-like bureaucracy, those in the Russian establishment who like to be associated with liberal values are in fact the co-authors of this system and their claim to Russian liberalism is no more legitimate than that of the former KGB types (Kommersant, October 29).
Indeed, it were the “liberals” in the then President Boris Yeltsin’s entourage who supplied him with an idea to choose his successor, flaunting the elections, and helped to pick the then FSB (former KGB) head, Vladimir Putin, and later elaborated Putin’s new political and economic agenda. The same people have also had their hand in turning the freedom of press into a phantom in Russia. Kashin is 30 and cannot remember the long lines at the press kiosks in the late 1980’s, when Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost created, virtually overnight, an enormous market for quality information in the Soviet Union. Just a few years later, this market was destroyed by the new Russian ruling elites, some of them still in the establishment, others in the “liberal opposition,” as they started to use the mass media for political manipulation and power brokering.
Capitalizing on the mass interest in quality information implied that long and hard work was needed to create an effective distribution and sales network. It was much easier to raise the needed cash from advertising or, better still, new owners. The mass media were soon divided between a few so-called oligarchs and reflected the problems of society in a crooked mirror of their owners’ clan struggles. The profession created its own myths. A media outlet was considered “independent” if it was critical, what or who it was about did not really matter, as criticism, peppered heavily with pathos and moralizing, was often pre-paid for by competing rivals. In the provinces, mass media were an even easier prey to financial and political influence, and still are often controlled by the local authorities or business groups.
A number of individuals who had helped Yeltsin secure his re-election in 1996 were later “rewarded” with access to state resources. One of them, Vladimir Gusinsky, borrowed freely from state-controlled companies, Gazprom and Sberbank, with little intention of repayment, to develop his NTV channel into Russia’s leading TV station. Seeing himself as a king-maker, Gusinsky decided not to support either the Unity party, a new “party of power,” or Vladimir Putin, during the parliamentary and presidential campaigns of 2000-2001. His rival, Boris Berezovsky, who then controlled Russian Public Television (ORT), did so, but while Putin came out the winner, none of the oligarchs succeeded. It took the new president a few months to put an end to the political influence of the oligarchs and their misuse of the mass media for their own ends. A hostage of oligarchs, the freedom of press then became a state possession.
Media wars undermined the public trust in the media and the respect for journalism as a profession. But with the 2000’s consumer boom and the advertising money estimated at 126 billion rubles in 2008 (over $5 billion), media mangers did not bother about either recovering this trust or widening their audiences (Российский рынок рекламы упал на треть, но не сломался). Unlike the Western mass media, with their ratio of sales and advertising money tipped towards the former, most Russian media came to depend on advertising, with their sales hardly covering distribution costs. As a result, today, the only media in Russia with mass audiences are the state-controlled TV channels with light entertainment dominating their programming, yellowish tabloids and some glossies, with Cosmopolitan being the market’s flagman. The quality press has long become the market niche.
That is why there is no need for the authorities to kill “critical” journalists, they are not heard anyway. Kashin has worked for Kommersant, which produces a high quality editorial material and prides itself in being influential. However, with its 16 pages, a 130,000 circulation and an issue’s federal audience estimated at 290,000 readers, in a country of 140 million, it can hardly command a tangible influence on the population (О Коммерсантъе). Rather, it is read by a relatively small circle of high-powered bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, its position thus being something between an analytical institute for, and a platform for information exchange between the ruling power groups.
Consequently, people have in fact developed a wall of indifference between themselves and the mass media. Even such a high-profile media story as replacing the mayor of Moscow little impressed ordinary Russians. According to VTsIOM’s poll, only 13 percent knew that Sergei Sobyanin had become the Moscow mayor (Kommersant, October 29). Widespread political cynicism among the authorities is only matched by even greater indifference and mistrust of the mass media among the population. That is the price Russian society has paid for the pleasure of some in the Russian establishment and the opposition calling themselves “liberals.” A pleasure that Oleg Kashin was bold enough to challenge. President Dmitry Medvedev ordered Kashin’s case to be investigated by the highest authority, the Main Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee of the Procurator-General’s Office. Kashin’s attackers might even be found and prosecuted. But would it help the Russian population recover their trust in the liberal values, the freedom of press including?
Freedom of the Russian Press: a Story of Lost Trust
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Volume 7 Issue: 209
November 17, 2010
By: Elena Chinyaeva
The recent attack on the Russian journalist and blogger Oleg Kashin left him severely injured. While he was still unconscious in a medically induced coma, an avalanche of speculation surrounded who might be responsible, with the so-called “liberal opposition” groups quarrelling with each other over who would issue the sharpest declaration implying the duumvirate is responsible, at least for a situation when such attacks happen frequently threatening the freedom of the press in Russia (Kommersant, 10 November). Some observers went as far as stating that “former Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, directly implicates Putin and Medvedev in the crime” (EDM, 11 November). While Kasyanov might be surprised with such interpretations, the newly-appeared Kashin sympathizers from among the “liberals” stress how critical Kashin was about the “vertical of power” in Russia. They conveniently overlook how bitter he was about the hypocrisy of those who call themselves “Russian liberal opposition.”
The Kashin case has indeed sharpened the discussions over the freedom of the press and the role of media in Russian society. Two legislative amendments were proposed in the State Duma, to class attacks on journalists as if on state officials punishable by 12-years to life imprisonment. However, as the latest Levada center poll indicates, these initiatives would only irritate the society in general. Over the post-perestroika years, the image of a journalist in the public perception has grown contradictory, as a person who delivers not only objective information but also lies. This year among the ratings of the most respected professions, journalism (8 percent), was the third from last, with only politicians (7 percent) and salespeople (4 percent) scoring worse (Kommersant, November 11).
Paradoxically, Kashin was a good enough professional to address the inconvenient question of why such lukewarm public attitude to journalists and the freedom of press has become reality in Russia. Just a couple of weeks prior to the attack, Kashin ran a series of interviews with some of the organizers of public action against the ruling bureaucracy in which they denounced “unpopular and senseless personages from political opposition,” who only hamper the attempts to develop a meaningful and effective civil protest movement in Russia. As they said, it has become a fashion among “political glitterati ” to show up at the protest meetings, though both “the authorities and the opposition continue to view ordinary people as scum of the earth,” substituting political work with political infighting, while the journalistic community use preset clichés to describe protest groups (Aleksei Navalnyi, Stanislav Yakovlev, Sergei Smirnov, Kommersant, October 19; Maksim Solopov).
In his Kommersant blog, Kashin stated, that in Russia today, with her one-party political system, the state corporations’ monopoly, excessive corruption and feudal-like bureaucracy, those in the Russian establishment who like to be associated with liberal values are in fact the co-authors of this system and their claim to Russian liberalism is no more legitimate than that of the former KGB types (Kommersant, October 29).
Indeed, it were the “liberals” in the then President Boris Yeltsin’s entourage who supplied him with an idea to choose his successor, flaunting the elections, and helped to pick the then FSB (former KGB) head, Vladimir Putin, and later elaborated Putin’s new political and economic agenda. The same people have also had their hand in turning the freedom of press into a phantom in Russia. Kashin is 30 and cannot remember the long lines at the press kiosks in the late 1980’s, when Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost created, virtually overnight, an enormous market for quality information in the Soviet Union. Just a few years later, this market was destroyed by the new Russian ruling elites, some of them still in the establishment, others in the “liberal opposition,” as they started to use the mass media for political manipulation and power brokering.
Capitalizing on the mass interest in quality information implied that long and hard work was needed to create an effective distribution and sales network. It was much easier to raise the needed cash from advertising or, better still, new owners. The mass media were soon divided between a few so-called oligarchs and reflected the problems of society in a crooked mirror of their owners’ clan struggles. The profession created its own myths. A media outlet was considered “independent” if it was critical, what or who it was about did not really matter, as criticism, peppered heavily with pathos and moralizing, was often pre-paid for by competing rivals. In the provinces, mass media were an even easier prey to financial and political influence, and still are often controlled by the local authorities or business groups.
A number of individuals who had helped Yeltsin secure his re-election in 1996 were later “rewarded” with access to state resources. One of them, Vladimir Gusinsky, borrowed freely from state-controlled companies, Gazprom and Sberbank, with little intention of repayment, to develop his NTV channel into Russia’s leading TV station. Seeing himself as a king-maker, Gusinsky decided not to support either the Unity party, a new “party of power,” or Vladimir Putin, during the parliamentary and presidential campaigns of 2000-2001. His rival, Boris Berezovsky, who then controlled Russian Public Television (ORT), did so, but while Putin came out the winner, none of the oligarchs succeeded. It took the new president a few months to put an end to the political influence of the oligarchs and their misuse of the mass media for their own ends. A hostage of oligarchs, the freedom of press then became a state possession.
Media wars undermined the public trust in the media and the respect for journalism as a profession. But with the 2000’s consumer boom and the advertising money estimated at 126 billion rubles in 2008 (over $5 billion), media mangers did not bother about either recovering this trust or widening their audiences (Российский рынок рекламы упал на треть, но не сломался). Unlike the Western mass media, with their ratio of sales and advertising money tipped towards the former, most Russian media came to depend on advertising, with their sales hardly covering distribution costs. As a result, today, the only media in Russia with mass audiences are the state-controlled TV channels with light entertainment dominating their programming, yellowish tabloids and some glossies, with Cosmopolitan being the market’s flagman. The quality press has long become the market niche.
That is why there is no need for the authorities to kill “critical” journalists, they are not heard anyway. Kashin has worked for Kommersant, which produces a high quality editorial material and prides itself in being influential. However, with its 16 pages, a 130,000 circulation and an issue’s federal audience estimated at 290,000 readers, in a country of 140 million, it can hardly command a tangible influence on the population (О Коммерсантъе). Rather, it is read by a relatively small circle of high-powered bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, its position thus being something between an analytical institute for, and a platform for information exchange between the ruling power groups.
Consequently, people have in fact developed a wall of indifference between themselves and the mass media. Even such a high-profile media story as replacing the mayor of Moscow little impressed ordinary Russians. According to VTsIOM’s poll, only 13 percent knew that Sergei Sobyanin had become the Moscow mayor (Kommersant, October 29). Widespread political cynicism among the authorities is only matched by even greater indifference and mistrust of the mass media among the population. That is the price Russian society has paid for the pleasure of some in the Russian establishment and the opposition calling themselves “liberals.” A pleasure that Oleg Kashin was bold enough to challenge. President Dmitry Medvedev ordered Kashin’s case to be investigated by the highest authority, the Main Investigation Department of the Investigation Committee of the Procurator-General’s Office. Kashin’s attackers might even be found and prosecuted. But would it help the Russian population recover their trust in the liberal values, the freedom of press including?
Saturday, May 05, 2012
Customer Review of History and Education policy
Been going through a bunch of papers and came across this, that I thought others would appreciate:
History: The Customer Reviews
The New Yorker October 17, 2011
The Tsar Falls in Russia
I do not recommend the Russian Revolution. At first, I fell for the hype and was kind of excited to set fire to my landlord. But now it seems like it’s just getting to be a lot of yakkety-yak. What we need is already with us, as far as I’m concerned: breathing, harvest, an icon by Andrei Rublev in our church, some carnal relations.
We have enough trouble with Baba Yaga; we don’t need men from Moscow to tell us their dreams for our children. What do they think our children are doing today? They’re catching chickens and gathering damp birch sticks. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
This customer recommends the reign of Peter the Great instead.
On a slightly more serious note:
I've been reading The Anxiety Economy from the Jan/Feb 2012 issue of The Atlantic, which raises lots of issues but the most explicit is an (admittedly not very unique) point about education.
I may not have been following the presidential race as much as I might like, I feel his point of education barely coming up in the campaign is an understatement. It seems to me that there has been almost nothing on such a fundamental and potentially explosive issue. I really don't have good idea of where the candidates stance on education policy, especially Romney. The only specific proposals I really know of from Obama are the "race to the top" and educational debt relief. Have I missed something?
History: The Customer Reviews
The New Yorker October 17, 2011
The Tsar Falls in Russia
I do not recommend the Russian Revolution. At first, I fell for the hype and was kind of excited to set fire to my landlord. But now it seems like it’s just getting to be a lot of yakkety-yak. What we need is already with us, as far as I’m concerned: breathing, harvest, an icon by Andrei Rublev in our church, some carnal relations.
We have enough trouble with Baba Yaga; we don’t need men from Moscow to tell us their dreams for our children. What do they think our children are doing today? They’re catching chickens and gathering damp birch sticks. If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.
This customer recommends the reign of Peter the Great instead.
On a slightly more serious note:
I've been reading The Anxiety Economy from the Jan/Feb 2012 issue of The Atlantic, which raises lots of issues but the most explicit is an (admittedly not very unique) point about education.
I may not have been following the presidential race as much as I might like, I feel his point of education barely coming up in the campaign is an understatement. It seems to me that there has been almost nothing on such a fundamental and potentially explosive issue. I really don't have good idea of where the candidates stance on education policy, especially Romney. The only specific proposals I really know of from Obama are the "race to the top" and educational debt relief. Have I missed something?
Friday, May 04, 2012
Lonely Hearts, and lots more besides....
I came across the most recent copy of the London Review of Books and couldn't resist taking a look to see for myself the famously witty personal ads in the back. Sadly, there was only one worth any note this time:
Woman, 35: Large, untapped reserves of buttock and frontal lobe. Contact me at (email given).
There was also an interesting letter, in response to an article about a geographical oddity in Europe, Neutral Moresnet :
The Akwizgran Discrepancy
Reading Neal Ascherson’s account of Moresnet-neutre reminded me of another quirk of European geography (LRB, 22 March). The border between East and West Berlin followed the pre-existing municipal boundaries, but this line was quite irregular and when the Wall was built it cut a few corners. I remember seeing, in West Berlin in the mid-1980s, a collection of Gruftis and Autonomen – goths and anarchist punks – who had set up camp on a triangle of land about fifty yards on each side, hard up against the Wall, where they were playing very loud music and smoking spliffs without any interference from the West Berlin authorities. This was because the campers were on what was technically East German territory. I also saw some doors, with no handles on the Western side, set into the Wall where it ran alongside this triangle, and I was told, although I didn’t see it myself, that every so often the Volkspolizei would come through the doors, drag the Gruftis and Autonomen into the East, rough them up and throw them back out.
Nick Wray- Derby, UK
Woman, 35: Large, untapped reserves of buttock and frontal lobe. Contact me at (email given).
There was also an interesting letter, in response to an article about a geographical oddity in Europe, Neutral Moresnet :
The Akwizgran Discrepancy
Reading Neal Ascherson’s account of Moresnet-neutre reminded me of another quirk of European geography (LRB, 22 March). The border between East and West Berlin followed the pre-existing municipal boundaries, but this line was quite irregular and when the Wall was built it cut a few corners. I remember seeing, in West Berlin in the mid-1980s, a collection of Gruftis and Autonomen – goths and anarchist punks – who had set up camp on a triangle of land about fifty yards on each side, hard up against the Wall, where they were playing very loud music and smoking spliffs without any interference from the West Berlin authorities. This was because the campers were on what was technically East German territory. I also saw some doors, with no handles on the Western side, set into the Wall where it ran alongside this triangle, and I was told, although I didn’t see it myself, that every so often the Volkspolizei would come through the doors, drag the Gruftis and Autonomen into the East, rough them up and throw them back out.
Nick Wray- Derby, UK
Wednesday, May 02, 2012
The Metaphorical Avocado and Other Deep-Sea Butterflies
Having a good time daydreaming about what a blog entitled "The Metaphorical Avocado and Other Deep-Sea Butterflies" might contain/discuss.
Monday, March 05, 2012
A very eventful Presidential election in Russia-- despite the major protests throughout the country against electoral fraud the last time, questionable practices abound:Map of reported election violations (courtesy, GOLOS Foundation)
Bracing myself for the avalanche of repetitive news stories in the Western media about the election. Putin's Russia is not an updated version of the Soviet Union, despite how oppressive his tactics are.
On the lookout for a few interesting articles.
Some food for thought:
The fight over Russia’s future by Chrystia Freeland (Reuters)
After the Election: Putin Faces His Critics by Allan Lynch (East-West Institute)
Anyone out there have things to add to the list?
Bracing myself for the avalanche of repetitive news stories in the Western media about the election. Putin's Russia is not an updated version of the Soviet Union, despite how oppressive his tactics are.
On the lookout for a few interesting articles.
Some food for thought:
The fight over Russia’s future by Chrystia Freeland (Reuters)
After the Election: Putin Faces His Critics by Allan Lynch (East-West Institute)
Anyone out there have things to add to the list?
Friday, February 10, 2012
This is great-- a funny and innovative take on the Russian protests.
Russian City Bans Toy Demonstrations
RFE/RL Russian Service February 10, 2012
BARNAUL, Russia -- Authorities in the Siberian city of Barnaul have declared it is now illegal to organize antigovernment demonstrations using toy collections -- unless such protests have received permission from officials in advance.
Activists in Barnaul twice last month organized protests in which hundreds of teddy bears, Transformer toys, and Lego figurines bearing anti-Kremlin slogans and calling for fair elections were displayed in the city's main square.
Using this tactic, the activists managed to avoid possible prosecution for violating laws on unapproved public gatherings.
Barnaul deputy police chief Andrei Mulintsev told journalists on February 10 that from now on, organizers of toy demonstrations must obtain official permission from local authorities to do so.
Otherwise, they could be held accountable for breaking the law.
Russian City Bans Toy Demonstrations
RFE/RL Russian Service February 10, 2012
BARNAUL, Russia -- Authorities in the Siberian city of Barnaul have declared it is now illegal to organize antigovernment demonstrations using toy collections -- unless such protests have received permission from officials in advance.
Activists in Barnaul twice last month organized protests in which hundreds of teddy bears, Transformer toys, and Lego figurines bearing anti-Kremlin slogans and calling for fair elections were displayed in the city's main square.
Using this tactic, the activists managed to avoid possible prosecution for violating laws on unapproved public gatherings.
Barnaul deputy police chief Andrei Mulintsev told journalists on February 10 that from now on, organizers of toy demonstrations must obtain official permission from local authorities to do so.
Otherwise, they could be held accountable for breaking the law.
Saturday, February 04, 2012
Really interesting development in the North Caucasus:
from Eurasia Daily Monitor
February 3, 2012 -- Volume 9, Issue 24
Leader Of The Caucasus Emirate Vows To Stop Attacks Against Russian Civilians
On February 2, the leader of the North Caucasus rebels Doku Umarov made an astonishing statement in support of the growing movement in Russia against Vladimir Putin. In a dramatic departure from the previously circulated views, the head of the Caucasus Emirate called on the rebels to stop attacks against Russian civilians. In a short video recording posted on the rebels’ primary website Kavkazcenter, Umarov spoke against a wintery background, presumably in the North Caucasus mountains, flanked by two young militants. Referring to the mass demonstrations against fraudulent parliamentary elections and the Russian government in general, Umarov said: “The peaceful population of Russia does not support the Cheka regime of Putin… [T]hese people are hostages to the same regime that brutally fights against Islam on the territory of the Caucasus.” Given the new circumstances, Umarov said, “the Mujahedeen must protect this civilian population” since these people do not fight against Muslims, but rather oppose Putin’s regime that attacks Islam in the North Caucasus. The Caucasus Emirate leader said that people of Russia are also exploited by the regime in Moscow and oppose this regime and therefore should not come under attack by the rebels. Umarov issued direct orders to curb operations that are in progress, if civilians might suffer in these attacks. Instead, Doku Umarov called on the insurgents to focus their efforts on attacking law enforcement agencies, the military, the security services, state officials and the so-called “national traitors” or “collaborators” (http://kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml, February 2).
For years the North Caucasus rebels habitually attacked civilians across Russia, mostly in Moscow and the North Caucasus, on the grounds that they were legitimate targets since they initially supported war in Chechnya and then throughout the North Caucasus. The last notorious attack against civilians in Moscow took place on January 24, 2011, when a 21-year-old man from Ingushetia carried out suicide attack in the Moscow airport of Domodedovo. The attack killed 37 people and left 170 people injured. Doku Umarov took responsibility for the attack and Russian investigators confirmed his responsibility (http://newsru.com/russia/24jan2012/dvo.html, January 24).
According to Avram Shmulevich, an Israeli expert on the Caucasus, if the North Caucasus’ insurgents abstain from targeting the civilian population, it would have a “radical impact” on the course of insurgency war in the region. Terror attacks against Russian civilians did not benefit the “Islamist underground,” writes Shmulevich, while the Russian government benefited from them, posing as its people’s protector. “Death of the civil population cannot have an impact on the Russian government’s policies, because the Kremlin is totally independent from its population. In the Russian Federation there are no mechanisms of people’s influence on the government; precisely because of that, this type of terrorism cannot lead to political changes,” Shmulevich warned. To improve their international standing and their acceptance in Russia, the North Caucasus insurgency should abide by the policy of not targeting the civilian population, Shmulevich concluded (http://avrom-caucasus.livejournal.com/155725.html).
Doku Umarov’s statement arrived two days before the loose coalition of the Russian opposition forces scheduled a protest march in Moscow. The march For Fair Elections is scheduled to take place on February 4 in central Moscow. As of February 2, over 27,000 people indicated they would come for the march and another 6,000 showed they might attend it on the event’s page in Facebook (http://www.facebook.com/events/212286018856867/).
The Russian public is unlikely to change its negative attitude toward the North Caucasus insurgents as the result of Umarov’s statement to stop targeting civilians. Official Moscow may even try to portray the Russian opposition as “terrorists’ allies.” Still, this statement neutralizes possible plots of the Russian government officials to ban public protests under the pretext of “terrorism threat.” Also if an attack against civilians still takes place in the run up to the presidential elections on March 4, it will be harder for the government to blame it on the insurgents, while the latter also will be dis-incentivized to assume responsibility for it. In his statement, Umarov said that if an attack against civilians takes place, it should be regarded as “a provocation of an agonizing Cheka regime” (http://kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml, February 2).
The situation in Russia quickly changes, opposition figures get access to the state controlled TV, Vladimir Putin offers “coalition government” for the opposition, but it is still unclear what the outcome of the March 4 elections will be. One of the most prolific Russian nationalist commentators, Alexander Prokhanov proclaimed that an “orange revolution” in Russia already started ( http://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/854232-echo/#element-text, February 1). Putin’s political maneuverings with proposals to return direct governors’ elections, form a coalition government, ascribe to ethnic Russians a special role of “state-founding people” to appease Russian nationalists, and other initiatives have found little support so far as his popularity rating drops below 50 percent. With the Caucasus Emirate’s announcement to abstain from attacks against civilians, Putin is deprived of yet another card that he may have used to boost his popularity. The emerging situation is one of uncertainty and transition to a new political equilibrium. In the words of the political strategist who was close to the Kremlin until recently, Gleb Pavlovsky: “Putin faces a real problem with ruling the country because the old system [of governance] ceased to exist after what happened on December 10, last year” (http://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-02-03/1_trap.html, February 3).
The latest initiative of the Caucasus Emirate points to a potential peace settlement in the North Caucasus, if the government changes in Moscow result in bringing to power a new generation of Russian politicians. Neither the political change in Russia nor the peace settlement in the North Caucasus should be taken for granted. However, peaceful transition in the region becomes one of the distinct possibilities, as signs emerge of evolution of Russian politics toward a more participatory political model.
--Valery Dzutsev
from Eurasia Daily Monitor
February 3, 2012 -- Volume 9, Issue 24
Leader Of The Caucasus Emirate Vows To Stop Attacks Against Russian Civilians
On February 2, the leader of the North Caucasus rebels Doku Umarov made an astonishing statement in support of the growing movement in Russia against Vladimir Putin. In a dramatic departure from the previously circulated views, the head of the Caucasus Emirate called on the rebels to stop attacks against Russian civilians. In a short video recording posted on the rebels’ primary website Kavkazcenter, Umarov spoke against a wintery background, presumably in the North Caucasus mountains, flanked by two young militants. Referring to the mass demonstrations against fraudulent parliamentary elections and the Russian government in general, Umarov said: “The peaceful population of Russia does not support the Cheka regime of Putin… [T]hese people are hostages to the same regime that brutally fights against Islam on the territory of the Caucasus.” Given the new circumstances, Umarov said, “the Mujahedeen must protect this civilian population” since these people do not fight against Muslims, but rather oppose Putin’s regime that attacks Islam in the North Caucasus. The Caucasus Emirate leader said that people of Russia are also exploited by the regime in Moscow and oppose this regime and therefore should not come under attack by the rebels. Umarov issued direct orders to curb operations that are in progress, if civilians might suffer in these attacks. Instead, Doku Umarov called on the insurgents to focus their efforts on attacking law enforcement agencies, the military, the security services, state officials and the so-called “national traitors” or “collaborators” (http://kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml, February 2).
For years the North Caucasus rebels habitually attacked civilians across Russia, mostly in Moscow and the North Caucasus, on the grounds that they were legitimate targets since they initially supported war in Chechnya and then throughout the North Caucasus. The last notorious attack against civilians in Moscow took place on January 24, 2011, when a 21-year-old man from Ingushetia carried out suicide attack in the Moscow airport of Domodedovo. The attack killed 37 people and left 170 people injured. Doku Umarov took responsibility for the attack and Russian investigators confirmed his responsibility (http://newsru.com/russia/24jan2012/dvo.html, January 24).
According to Avram Shmulevich, an Israeli expert on the Caucasus, if the North Caucasus’ insurgents abstain from targeting the civilian population, it would have a “radical impact” on the course of insurgency war in the region. Terror attacks against Russian civilians did not benefit the “Islamist underground,” writes Shmulevich, while the Russian government benefited from them, posing as its people’s protector. “Death of the civil population cannot have an impact on the Russian government’s policies, because the Kremlin is totally independent from its population. In the Russian Federation there are no mechanisms of people’s influence on the government; precisely because of that, this type of terrorism cannot lead to political changes,” Shmulevich warned. To improve their international standing and their acceptance in Russia, the North Caucasus insurgency should abide by the policy of not targeting the civilian population, Shmulevich concluded (http://avrom-caucasus.livejournal.com/155725.html).
Doku Umarov’s statement arrived two days before the loose coalition of the Russian opposition forces scheduled a protest march in Moscow. The march For Fair Elections is scheduled to take place on February 4 in central Moscow. As of February 2, over 27,000 people indicated they would come for the march and another 6,000 showed they might attend it on the event’s page in Facebook (http://www.facebook.com/events/212286018856867/).
The Russian public is unlikely to change its negative attitude toward the North Caucasus insurgents as the result of Umarov’s statement to stop targeting civilians. Official Moscow may even try to portray the Russian opposition as “terrorists’ allies.” Still, this statement neutralizes possible plots of the Russian government officials to ban public protests under the pretext of “terrorism threat.” Also if an attack against civilians still takes place in the run up to the presidential elections on March 4, it will be harder for the government to blame it on the insurgents, while the latter also will be dis-incentivized to assume responsibility for it. In his statement, Umarov said that if an attack against civilians takes place, it should be regarded as “a provocation of an agonizing Cheka regime” (http://kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2012/02/03/88591.shtml, February 2).
The situation in Russia quickly changes, opposition figures get access to the state controlled TV, Vladimir Putin offers “coalition government” for the opposition, but it is still unclear what the outcome of the March 4 elections will be. One of the most prolific Russian nationalist commentators, Alexander Prokhanov proclaimed that an “orange revolution” in Russia already started ( http://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalno/854232-echo/#element-text, February 1). Putin’s political maneuverings with proposals to return direct governors’ elections, form a coalition government, ascribe to ethnic Russians a special role of “state-founding people” to appease Russian nationalists, and other initiatives have found little support so far as his popularity rating drops below 50 percent. With the Caucasus Emirate’s announcement to abstain from attacks against civilians, Putin is deprived of yet another card that he may have used to boost his popularity. The emerging situation is one of uncertainty and transition to a new political equilibrium. In the words of the political strategist who was close to the Kremlin until recently, Gleb Pavlovsky: “Putin faces a real problem with ruling the country because the old system [of governance] ceased to exist after what happened on December 10, last year” (http://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-02-03/1_trap.html, February 3).
The latest initiative of the Caucasus Emirate points to a potential peace settlement in the North Caucasus, if the government changes in Moscow result in bringing to power a new generation of Russian politicians. Neither the political change in Russia nor the peace settlement in the North Caucasus should be taken for granted. However, peaceful transition in the region becomes one of the distinct possibilities, as signs emerge of evolution of Russian politics toward a more participatory political model.
--Valery Dzutsev
Monday, January 30, 2012
A taste of Russian humor:
The following is said to be the final article of a Russian law:
If any person or persons find themselves understanding or approaching the understanding or comprehension of any part or role of this rule or law, they should contact the relevant authorities immediately so the law can be changed.
The following is said to be the final article of a Russian law:
If any person or persons find themselves understanding or approaching the understanding or comprehension of any part or role of this rule or law, they should contact the relevant authorities immediately so the law can be changed.
Thursday, January 19, 2012
Monday, January 16, 2012
Very interesting site, previously under cyber attack during the latest elections: Golos Association
They set up a daring site where they encouraged people to report election violations into a central map
Карта Нарушений Выборы 2011
This gives a good background on what they've been dealing with:
A Crowd Sourced Map Becomes the Symbol of Russia's Democratic Decline
They set up a daring site where they encouraged people to report election violations into a central map
Карта Нарушений Выборы 2011
This gives a good background on what they've been dealing with:
A Crowd Sourced Map Becomes the Symbol of Russia's Democratic Decline
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